(texts, talk, versions of the world), in contrast to script theoqy's primacy of perception. This is done through a critical examination of script theory and an empirical examination of how "personal" scriptlike formulations occur in conversation.
In social cognition theory, scripts are essentially perception-andaction schemas. A schema is "a spatially and./or temporally organized cognitive structure in which the parts are connected on the basis of contiguities that have been experienced in time or space" (Mandler, 1979, p. 263) . Scripts are generalized event schemas, which are "derived from concrete experience ofevents and thus represent'how the world works.' Nonetheless, they are very much abstractions from experienced reality." (Nelson, 1986, p. 8) . Schemas organize both perception and action, and this applies equally to scripts: 'A script is a knowledge structure in long-term memory that specifies the conditions and actions for achieving a goal" (Barsalou, 1992, p. 76) ; compare "scripts tell people what to do in familiar situations" (Nelson, 1981, p. 109) . Script theory attempts to explain how individuals understand and act within a recognizable and routinely ordered world of events. It assumes that events themselves (social events primarily) are more or less ordered and predictable, such that competence to perceive, to recall, and to take part in those events rests on our capacity as individuals to draw generalized abstractions across variations in experience, and to notice and learn from exceptions (expectation failures). This foundational "cognitive-perceptual" metatheory is retained across variations and developments in its basic principles (Abelson, 1981; Schank, 1982; Schank & Abelson, 7977) , and throughout its various extensions from cognitive science into experimental psycholory (e.g., Bellezza & Bower, 1982; Bower, Black, & Tirrner, 1979; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith, 1981) , developmental psycholory (e.g., Nelson, 1981 Nelson, , 1986 Nelson & Gruendel, 1986) , and social psychology (e.g., Abelson, 1976 Abelson, , 1981 Wyer & Carlston, 1979) .
The mental representation of cultural scripts, such as what to do and what to expect when visiting restaurants, cinemas, dentists, or shopping in department stores, is thought to develop out ofpersonal scripts (Nelson, 1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977) . Children and adults form schematic understandings primarily through repeated experiences in the daily round ofactivities. Aithough events that conform to script expectations start to pass largely unnoticed, the things we notice, remark on, and remember are the exceptions or anomalies, and these in turn can become, with sufficient regularity, the basis of new schematic scripts or subscripts. The approach taken in this article is to examine a corpus of occasions onwhich people talk about events and actions in their lives as being singular, regular, or exceptional. Three basic and related features of script theory are questioned: the primacy of perception over language, the relation between what is scripted and what is noticeable or remarkable, and the scripted status of personal events as things we merely encounter or notice. The proposed alternative is to view scripted versions of events as pragmatically formulated constructions, which brings the theoretical and empirical reward of being able to deal with the specific details of script talk as a spontaneous activity.l Tb develop an alternative to script theory, it is necessary to distinguish three kinds of things to which the w ord script might refer. Scripts can be (a) features ofthe world, of events themselves-we can call these scripts'; (b) features of perception and cognition-scriptsp; (c) features of how events are described-scriptsd. According to how these three things are thought to be related, it is possible to distinguish between various theoretical and anall'tical approaches. Ecological realism, and much of recent schema theory, places them in the order 1-2-3, with the objective nature of events being picked up perceptually, abstracted across instances into perceived generalities, and cropping up semantically in how people talk about, comprehend, and recall (descriptions of)routine places and events (see Lakoff, 1987) . Constructionistvarieties of schema theory, such as Bartlett's (1932) , would give more explanatory priority to scriptsp, where schemata provide interpretational flames for seeing the world, rather than merely reflecting its objective nature; an order more like 2-1-3. Of course, both directions are usually allowed for, explicitly so in Neisser's (1976) "perceptual cycle," and in developmental (e.g., Piagetian) accounts, where the longterm formation of schemas is realistic but provides for distorted perceptions ofspecific new instances.
Thus far, the theoretical possibilities have scriptsd firmly in third place. Event descriptions are assumed to derive from how people perceive and understand the world. This means that textual versions of events can be freely used as part of method and explication, in experiments, simulations, and theoretical expositions, as more or less transparent representations either ofscripts'or ofscriptsp. This is not to ignore the possibility offalse descriptions or lies but to consider those to be classes of error or exception, to be set aside from the canonical relations between language, mind, and reality. However, a third approach, based on discourse theory (Edwards & Potter, 1992 , 1993 , entertains the counterintuitive possibility ofplacing scriptsd first, and not only for lies and errors.z That is the approach developed here. Assumptions about the nature ofreal-world events (scripts') and about participants'general perceptions ofevents (scriptsp) are set aside while we examine event descriptions lscriptsd). Spontaneous event descriptions are always specifically "occasioned" phenomena (Heritage, 1984; Schegloff, 1972) . This means that any particular description can be examined for how it performs some interactional business at the specific juncture of its occurrence.
The suggestion that scipt formulations are empirically interesting, interactionally occasioned phenomena contrasts with their use in script theory. It is not only that script theorists deal mostly with invented or idealized texts, or ones reconstructed anecdotally, but that script theory pays scant attention to the nature of descriptions as potentially arbitrary and variable, rhetorically designed, or interactionally occasioned constructions of events. It is argued here that, to discover the conceptual resources that people use in producing and understanding event descriptions, we must also examine the spontaneous production and receipt ofevent descriptions in conversation.
It may appear that focusing on scriptsd, rather than scripts' or scriptsp, sidesteps script theoqy's prime concerns with knowledge structures, perception, and planned action. But this is not so. Event descrip tions occupy a central position in the articulation, testing, and ecological relevance of script theory, even though explications of the theory emphasize nonlinguistic perception and action. This is the case in generalized theoretical treatments (e.g., schank's (L982), accounts of conversations about restaurants, "suckering" experiences, and the Iike), in experimental and simulation procedures involving textual comprehension (e.g., Bower et al., 1979) , and in studies in which children are asked questions that begin "What happens when . . '" (e'g', Nelson & Gruendel, 1986) . The explication of what people are doing when they de scribe routine events or comprehend descriptions appears therefore to be one of the theoris prime domains of applicability; descriptions are analytically unavoidable. Also, it quickly becomes unclear in practice how events "themselves" can be distinguished from how they are described, except by favouring one description over another. People themselves, who produce actual event descriptions, may treat them as preferable to alternatives. It is a pervasive feature ofspontaneous discourse that formulations ofevents have a rhetorical design (Billig, 1987; Edwards & Pottet, \992) .
PLANS AND CONTINGENCIES: TIIE RESTAURANT SCRIPT
The classic example is the restaurant script. Nelson (1981, p' 102) This script outline is very "schematic," in that it misses out many things, on the basis (a) that these can always be put into a more elaborate version (for example, the summary above omits the action of payrng), or (b) that they are optional (ordering dessert later, maybe), or (c) that they are not scripted an)rway (the colour of the furnishings, the topic of conversation over dinner). The assumption is that, if we chose to delve more pedantically, events would become more detailed, but still essentially scripted with options, rather than the scripted character of social action breaking down altogether. However, let us staywith pedantryfor a moment, because there remains the possibility that scriptedness, even for restaurants, is more a feature of our own schematic descriptions than of the organization of action and cognition in real settings. A sentence such as "Jim ate at the restaurant" would not carry all those implications if he worked there, for example, and it is well-known that there is a large variety of kinds of eating places, which vary in precisely the sequential order of actions that the script concept is designed to capture. There are fast-food places, "Europeanstyle" restaurants with waiters, and various combinations where customers order at the counter Oike McDonalds). but then a waiter serves them. Of course, any such variation that we can recall or imagine can always be accommodated as a subscript, another type of restaurant, another person's experience,3 the basis for some cognitive reorganization, or merely a memorable exception, and these are exactly how script theory encompasses them. The worry is that, if we pursue pedantry dogmatically enough, the resulting complexities will never cease, and that the initial, simplifying virtues of the script concept will disappear too. The most serious problem for the restaurant script is that we might not need it. Not only are there plenty of situational, "ecological" cues available in any setting that help specify what to do (and therefore require less elaborate mental models and plans to deal with them) but it may also be that the only things that can vary will vary. Arguably, the orderliness of the restaurant script, once we start dealing with a lot of eating places, is either necessary or definitional. Either it is physically necessitated (you have to gain access to the food before you can eat it, you have to enter the restaurant before you leave it, you have to go to your table before you can sit down at it) or else it is semantically defined, by what we mean by "restaurant" (such as a place where you can pay for and eat prepared meals). Apart from that, everything that is neither necessary nor definitional wiII turn out to be variable, such as when to pay, whether there is a waiter, whether "service" (compulsory tipping) is included in the price, and all the obviously variable things that any parbicular restaurant will possess and that no script model was ever designed to include.
The essential problem with trying to account for the orderliness of eating out by invoking mental scripts is that it is not clear when, if ever, we come to the point where plans are adequate to handle contingencies (Suchman, 1987) . Because rules do not specify their applications (Collins, 1990; Dreyfus, 1979; Wittgenstein, 1953) , except by invoking further rules to which the restriction must also apply, there always arises the problem ofaccounting for the contingencies ofsituated actions (see Dresher & Hornstein, 1976) . The issue here is that there may well be a form of competence for dealing with situated actions that, to the extent that it works in practice' may manage at the same time to account for a lot of the orderliness of action and understanding that the script concept was invented for.
Restaurants have served as a useful topic for explications of script theory. They stand somewhere between more highly scripted routines such as catechisms and ritual ceremonies on one hand, and the one-off vagaries of existence on the other. Script theory is designed to be applicable not only to very formalized routines, which are easily specified but highly restricted, but to the more messy, partial, in-the-making ways in which people deal with, and start to build up perceptions of, the routine features of everydaylife. Indeed, these are the developmental root and origin ofscripts, the startingpoint for perceptual orderliness and for noticeable anomalies. They are also the focus of the alternative analysis that is to follow SCRIPT FORMUI,ATIONS, INTERACTION, AND ACCOUNTABILTTY One way to investigate this issue is to proceed bottom-up, from the empirical character of event descriptions, and see how far we are able to deal with conceptual orderliness in terms of their moment-to-moment production. This will be the approach taken here, an approach derived from ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, and from discourse analysis.a The aim is not to do away with the powerful explanatory notions ofgoals, plans, and scriptedness; rather, the intent is to investigate exactly how these kinds of notions may feature as participants' own explanatory resources, if and when they do. Talk and action in formal settings can be investigated for how participants deal with, make relevant and hold themselves accountable to, whatever routines, preorganizations, and constraints they count themselves to be under (Drew & Heritage, 1992) . Also, conversation of any kind, even the least formal, can be investigated for how parbicipants treat the world as more or less orderly, predictable, scripted, planful, and so on. The advantage ofinvestigating scriptedness (and other cognitive issues) in this way is that we are able to see not only if and how it arises as a participant's concern but, at the same time, how it works in the context of situational contingencies.
There is already a body of work in conversation and discourse analysis that can be made to bear on the notion of scriptedness. The theme of much of this work is the way that scriptedness figures not as a fixed characteristic ofevents or ofevent perception but as a feature that can be built into events through their reporting. The important point is that euent reporting is itself a situated actiuity; it is not merely communication, a conveyance of information or conceptions about some other activity (see Edwards, in press; Reddy, L979) . Because reports are always underdetermined by events, they can be examined for how they place constmctions on events and how those constructions are contingent on, and reflexively perform, the activities being done in the reporting.
In just the way that breach formulations describe actions such that they require accounts, script formulations can be ways of formulating actions to achieve the opposite, to make them perfectly normal, what everybody or anybody would do, as routine, not needing any special account. This is how some kinds of "extreme case formulations" work (Pomerantz, 1986) , particularly those that formulate what attribution theorists call "consensus" (Kelley, 1, 967 ; see also Edwards & Potter, 1992 , 1993 Potter & Edwards, 1990) . A consensus formulation is one in which some activity is described as what everybody or most people do, where that serves to normalize the activity, In this kind of analytical work, it is not assumed that there are actual routines out there in the world and common knowledge of them inside people's heads. Rather, spontaneous discourse is often concerned wit}:' claiming that kind of status for actual instances of events, not simply as a matter of cognitivelytrying our best to make sense ofthe world and problem-solve our way through the details of experience. It is important to recognize that using a device such as a script formulation is a rhetorical moue; it is not automatic, not guaranteed success, and can be countered. It is not automatic as a feature of cognition and reality, and it is not automatic in its interactional consequences.
Script formulations set up a contrast with, or a generalization flom, specific actions. But it is not that scripts must always normalize and breach formulations always pathologize. Script formulations may be used to pathologize too, just as exceptions can be used to excuse or praise. It is necessary to examine spontaneous talk to see how this flexibility works, because these kinds of rhetorical upshots are highly dependent on the particulars of actual conversations. In Smith's (1978) analysis of the textual construction of someone ("K' ) as mentally ill, there is a pervasive use of script formulations for Ks behavior, which help establish it as robustly reportable as such, while simultaneously contrasting it with an explicit or implied norm for everyone else. For example, "K was unable to put on a teapot cover correctly, she would not reverse its position to make it fit, but would simply keep slamming it down on the pot" (p. 46). This example is similar to others in smith's analysis, where the actions being described as routine (what K "would" do) are suggestive of actions that may well have been one-offs but that are descriptively worked up in this way as scripted.5 This introduces the possibility that script formulations are constructed and deployed not simply to d.escribe regularities in the world, or even perceived regularities, but precisely to accompli sh events os scripted, or as exceptions. And they are formulations that attend to the fact that they can be, and are likely to be, countered (see Billig ,1987) , such that working up their scripted generality will involve refuting possible counterdescriptions. The empirical analysis that follows explores a set of closely related features of script and breach formulations. Rather than trawling conversations specifically for descriptions ofvisits to restaurants (although a couple are included), dentists, and other predetermined settings, the focus is on all those occasions on which events and activities of any sort are formulated interms of theirrecurrent, typical, or excetr> tional nature. The aim is to confront scripts in the making. The thing at issue is the perceptual versus discursive nature ofhow particular events get counted as, included as, or excluded from some general scripted class;how such a class comes to be formulated; and what sort of functional basis there might be for such formulations. Following from the introductory discussion, these discourse features can be framed as a set of general predictions 1. There will be a process of formulating events as routine or exceptional, in that event descriptions can be assembled in ways that claim such a status for particulai events. Events can be given the status of one-off occutre.rces (items), exemplars (instances) of a script, exceptions to a norm, or cast directly in generalized terms. z. scripl fragments, th6 speiifrc details that are made explicit in.talk, will dispiay ai interactionil sensitivity in how they are selected and de-,.rib"i, rather than being those elements that happen to be cognitive anomalies, expectation fiilures, or otherwise merely and neutrally "noticeable."
3. script formulations will occur where participalt-s are dealing with ac-.oo.rtubility, both for the actions described and for the actions done in the telling. This will include (a) establishing a n_ormative base against which sorie other actions, the ones at issue, stand out as anomalous and requiring an account; (b) establishing_as normal, part of a scripted set, .orn" p.iti"olar (at issue) actions thathave been, or might otherwise be, constmcted as peculiar and accountable; (c) establishing the scripted' expectable nature of a person's behaviour as part of praising, blaming, or pathologizing them.
METHOD TIIE DATA
The main data source is a series of spontaneous telephone conversations recorded and transcribed by Gail Jefferson. These conversations were not recorded for the purposes of this study; however, they provide an exceptionally rich set of materials for the study of natural interaction. The analysis uses the 15 conversations to which the author had access. The transcription conventions are those that Jefferson has developed for conversation analysis and that have become standard for studies of"talk in interaction" (Schegloff, 1989) . The system is designed to capture features of talk that participants treat as interactionally relevant, rather than features that would be useful in investigating linguistic categories such as phonology, or relations between intonation and grammar. This does not mean, however, that all transcribed features in a given data extract will figure in any particular analysis of it. Descriptions of the general system can be found in Schenkein (1978) , Atkinson and Heritage (1984) , or Button and Lee (1987) . In addition to the use of conventional symbols, the system uses alterations to conventional spelling to represent vocal delivery. The extracts used here include some simplifications from Jefferson's original transcriptions, to assist readability. The appendix provides a key to the main symbols used.
ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES
Analysis is based on the principles of conversation analysis and discourse analysis (in the form defined by Potter & Wetherell, 1987) . One of the features of this kind of work is that analytical procedures are demonstrated in the course ofactual analyses oftranscribed data. However, some basic features can be stated briefly here, in the form of heuristic principles guiding the analyses that follow.
Conuersation analysis (CA) focuses on talk as a form of social interaction. The content of talk is examined as a sequentially and interactionally "occasioned" phenomenon, performing social actions in and through its production. The nature of the world reported on in talk, and the mental states or cognitions of the parbicipants producing it, are not the kinds of things that the analyst is trying to discover. Rather, they frgure as the kinds of categories and interpretive resources that participants themselves are dealing with, invoking, constructing, or otherwise orienting to in their talk. Participants'catego2t9 ries are those that parbicipants deploy, orient to, and treat as accountable. So, to the extent that people deploy scriptedness as a way of conceptualizing events, they will do so through descriptions, script formulations, orientations to events as more or less routine or excetr> tional, and they will do so as part of the accomplishment of some interactional business performed through talking of the world in that way, and they will be treated by other participants as doing that. The details of specifrc script versions will display a precise sensitivity to the occasion oftheir production.
Discourse analysis (DA) draws on conversation analysis but also includes the study of written texts as well as talk. It derives from efforts to resolve methodological problems in social studies of science, concerning how to deal with participants' accounts of their own practices (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) , and it retains in its applications to psycholory a basic concern with the discursive production oftruth and reality, rhetoric, and knowledge (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Edwards, 1990) , Its major analytical categories are constmction, function, and variability. Construction is the process of building the world through descriptions; in script terms, this would be the process of describing events as scripted or as script-referenced anomalies. Function combines the interaction-orientation principle of CA, with the central DA principle of rhetorical design (Billig, 1987) . Rhetorical design is the principle that forms of argumentation are pervasive in talk and text, including ostensibly simple descriptions, such that any version of the world is likely to attend to possible or actual counterversions and to be treated as doing so by participants. Again, this implies that in investigating script formulations we need to be alert to how these are not merely expressions of a speaker's perceptually abstracted cognitions but will be sensitively constructed in their precise detail to deal with interactional and rhetorical contingencies. Variabillfy is the principle, which can also be formulated as an analytical hypothesis, that individual speakers will produce different and sometimes even contradictory versions of events. In traditional cognitive terms, such variations might be treated as signs of error, unreliability' or cognitive change, such that statistical, experimental, or sampling methods might have to be adopted to prevent them from entering a data corpus. For DA, variability is an important sign of constmction and function processes at work. such that variations in event constructions can be expected to show systematic, indeed constitutiue relations to variations in interactional and rhetorical orientation.o Further elaboration of these and other analytical principles can be found in Potter and Wetherell (1987) , and Edwards and Potter (1992) .
The procedure was to read through the 15 conversations, together with the audio recordings, looking for candidate "script" phenomena; descriptions ofactions that treated them as part ofa repeated pattern, or as exceptions to such a pattern. This produced about 50 substantial sequences of conversation, including some elaborated multiscript sequences. These were then organized into the analytical themes presented in the Analysis section below, which reflect the predictive set described before. Those data not given detailed presentation were excluded to avoid undue analybical repetition. Although there were several hundred candidate formulations in the data. it is neither possible nor meaningful to provide an exact count, because the status of any description as a script-relevantformulationwas not always clear cut. The reason for this is theoretically substantial rather than a matter ofcoding adequacy. The status ofa piece ofdiscourse as a script fragment, or as several scripts rather than pieces of a single script, is a substantial matter for analysis rather than for precoding. Further, it would be an artificial and preemptive move to begin with script theory and to look for examples (of references to restaurants, for example) in conversational materials, when the status of script theory for handling these sorts of materials (scriptsd) is at stake. Rather than doing that, the data extracts are chosen for how they display a variety of ways in which participants deal with events as more or less regular, routine, and expected.
ANALYSIS

OVERVIEW
The analysis is divided into sections for expository purposes, rather than to reflect the presence of discrete phenomena. People do not separate out, in their talk, its rhetoric, its accountability, its context sensitivity, and so on. One ofthe features ofspontaneous discourse is its richness and interconnectedness, in that descriptions of the world, for example, are not orly mixed with interactional considerations and contingencies but can be seen as designed precisely /or them. The following sections pick out the analytical themes introduced above, as follows: how specific details get mentioned; the notion of scriptedness as a construction on events; the ways in which script formulations attend to issues of accountability; the ways in which script talk deals with events as instances, generalities, and a basis for attributing dispositional descriptions to actors; and script rhetoric.
IMPLICIT SCRIPTS AND D(PLICIT DETAILS
One of the features to be expected of cognitive scripts (scriptsp) is that people do not have to elaborate them explicitly in conversation; they will remain largely hidden. Because they operate as taken-forgranted background knowledge, it is the exceptions or anomalies that we would expect to find in spontaneous conversation' Indeed, one of the few places we might expect to find elaborated descriptions of scripted activities is in reported conversations between cognitive scientists who are discussing the orderliness of cognitive contents (e.g', the schank-Norman dialogpe in schank, 1982). Other contexts might include overt planning talk, such as the training of restaurant waiters, programmed machine instmctions, rule-defrning committees, sports ieam tactics, or army drill (but for how even these may not be so clearly scripted, see Billig, 1987; Collins, 1990; Suchman, 1987) ' Otherwise, the kinds of things we would expect to find in ordinary discourse are exceptions, r.ro-uli"., or nonscripted phenomena. We shall start with "o-e e*arnples where background knowledge is indeed invoked through implication, and we shall see how these examples start to open up the interactional basis of script talk' Extract 1 NB:IV:13:R:257 The script issue in Extract 1 is that, although Lottie may routinely start worh at three on other days, saturdays are different. Lottie's correction to Emma's assertion is minimal (Line 21) but received by Emma as sufficient to prompt recognition; it is a "reminding." what we have here is a script fragment, interactionally produced, performing repair on a misundeistanding, by appealing to shared knowledge of a background social routine. Both script theory and discourse theory *orrt"d expect script talk to take this form, of scrlpt fragments occurring in interaction sequences, repairing misunderstandings rather than featuring as fully elaborated descriptions'
However, the precise details that are mentioned are not so much cognitive anomalies or exceptions, as interactionally relevant items. Th"e item "toda:y's $a:turday" (Line 21) is offered as part of t}:re script, serving here to correct Emma, who then signals recognition of it (Line 23). Tile mismatch and repair was interactional, between Lottie and Emma, rather than an expectation failure between script and reality. similarly, the going-to-work script detail "5ruh don't go to work'til three:,h; is offeted as part of the script rather than as a noticed """"ption to it, and again the basis for offering it is interactionally occasioned. Immediately prior to this bit of dialogue, Emma and Lottie had been sharing a bad luck story. mma's choice of a specific script fragment (Line 16) for explicit mention can now be seen as occasioned, in a way that specification of, for example, what route Lottie takes to work or what she does there was not. And of course, the "don't go . . . 'til" formulation reinforces that sense, of having some free time before having to go to work. So, although we can see in a brief extract like this the clear relevance of script theory in specifying the role of background knowledge in conversational recall and event description, we can also begin to see how specific details get to be mentioned in the precise way that they do, as a feature of interactional contingencies rather than merely perceptual expectation failures. Note the items "No:thin"' (Lines 2 and 4), and the probably ironic "Gettin'pi:nk" (Lines 8 and 11) and also the way these are initially responded to by [6] [7] 10) . By the end of the extract we can see that Fran's initial question "'What're you guys doing at the bea::ch" (Line 1) could be read as asking, why are you there at this time rather than later? However, Ted treats it as an inquiry into what activities they are up to, such that his responses in Lines 2, 8, and 11 can be seen as invoking conventional knowledge of places and their associated activities-nothing special, the usual thing' so conventional in fact that no details at all need to be provided. Fran signals difficulty (especially Line 10) with Tbd's responses and eventually repairs the probable misunderstanding by spelling out a different basis for the inquiry (Lines t2-14) .
Tb understand this talk, it is useful (for both participants and analysts) to be able to refer to baqkground scriptp knowledge, in that the participants appear to have suffrcient understanding ofthe usual kinds oftni"i. that people do at the beach, that these can be treated as not worth mentioning or enquiring into. Again, absence of explicit detail occurs as an interactional feature, a signal oftrouble and repair concerning the point of the question being asked. Moreover, those details that do-get mentioned are not dictated by being exceptions or anomalies l,,gJtting pink" seems to be provided precisely because that is what it isl a further index of "nothing" and indeed provides the occasion for Fran's repair). The thing of interest is exactly what details, or level of detail, arl provided and how we might account for this analytically. Although it is tempting to read into such an interaction the presence in the Lackgron.td of a particular example of scriptp, it rs not clear except through looking at the details ofthe interaction what exactly that ,,script" might be. Indeed, the idea that there is such a thing as a beach routine, however empty its content, works interactionally for Ted as a device for getting Fran to explain the point of her inquiry' In contrast to ttre relative invisibility of script information in Extracts 1 and 2, in Extract 3 Emma starts to produce a detailed list of items that she herself signals as conventional (scripted) for a Thanksgrving d,inner (euerything in Line 7; the whipped cream' boiled onions, and so on in Lines 9 and 14).
Extract 3 NB:IV:10:R:41 The puzzle in Extract 3 for script theory (i.e., whatever version of script'/r theory) is how come these conuentional items get listed like that.8 However, we can see how the provision of these details is interactionally occasioned. First, Emma is displaying to Lottie how she does not need anybhing brought for her; her list constitutes an elaborated accounf for turning down Lottie's offer of help-she has all she needs (compare the role of accounts in refusals of offers and invitations in Davidson,7984; and in Drew, 1984) . Apart from the food details, the terms euerything (Line 7), euen (Line 9) and just (Line 16) further reinforce this interactionally relevant sufficiency of the provisions Emma has already bought. Second, we can see in the continuation of the extract (Line 18 and the rest below) a further piece of interactional business performed by Emma's detailed list. Line 18 draws attention to a major theme in many of Emma's and Lottie's conversations, which is Emma's claim that her husband Bud has walked out on her and refuses to return for the imminent Thanksgiving dinner, and that their daughter Barbara may also refuse to bring her husband and children because of all the trouble between Emma and Bud (see also "Items, Instances, Generalities, and Dispositions" below). So Emma's detailed (without needing to be complete) listing of the items she has bought and her associated preparations help build her case for Bud's unreasonableness and emphasize all the thankless trouble she has gone to. Offering the dinner to some marines from Camp Pendleton would, in contrast, and precisely for that contrast, provide a good dinner to deserving, nonfamily people who might appreciate it (Lines 26-29). It is these sorts ofinteractional concerns and contingencies (rather than disinterested, protoscientific "noticings") that provide the basis for account details, and that is how remarks about what might be called script central as well as exceptional things are occasioned. Script formulations construct events as scripted. Participants describe a world in which events can be treated as discrete items (oneoffs), or as parts or instances of a more general pattern. In Extract 4, Emma has just reported to Lottie on some nice quality shoes she has bought, at a bargain price. The script issue embedded here is what you can expect ifyou take shoes to be dyed at Anthony's versus other places. Extract 4 begins with a classic bit of "reminding" (Lines 1-3; see Schank, 1982) , where Lottie's thoughts about buying new shoes are (presented as) triggered by Emma's story. In this case, Lottie's choice of new shoes contrasts with Emma's; Lottie is going to buy some cheap shoes (rather than search for bargains) and make them into what she wants by getting them dyed. The details that follow attend carefully to how this constitutes an adequate thing to do; the dying will be a good, reliable job, and this is attested to by prior knowledge of what they do at Anthony's (Lines 6-8), and bolstered by the contrast with what happens at other places. The generalization concerning what happens when "sometimes you buy'em at these pl4ces" (Line 13) is exemplified by a specific instance (Lines 14-16). What is interesting here are the interactional contingencies that these formulations attend to. The contrast between Anthony's and the other places provides an account for Lottie's planned actions and displays her as acting sensibly rather than in a cheapskate or inadvisable manner. So, Anthony's is not just a place that dyes shoes but one that is known to do it perfectly. And the status of the episode with the shoes that needed to be "redye:d ag4!:n" (Lines 14-16) is raised to "script" level (Line 13) as an insta.rlce of what happerus at other places. Lottie's talk constructs events in terms of their status as episodic items, instances, and scripted generalities, where the fragments produced for description attend to her interac-tional accountability for choosing to buy cheap shoes, rather than do what Emma did.
The set of conversations under analysis contains two instances (Extracts 5 and 6) where visits to restaurants are discussed and that therefore permit an informative comparison with script theory's treatment.
Extract 5 NB:IV:10:R:51 Extract 5 contains a number of features that script theory would recognize: lunch details, "the" waitress (Line 18), the ordering of food, and so on, aII delivered as expectable items, with specific or newsworthy details nicely attached (the niceness of the waitress, the absence of ordered items, Lines 18-20, and how "ih-: got rea:l funny'' lLine22]). The food and the waitress were so good that the lack of menu items was funny and forgivable ("we didn' care," Line 24). These kinds of details, although not exactly predictable, make sense in both perceptual and discursive terms, both as the script-relevant kinds of things that would be noticeqble, and also as the kinds of things that would be interactionally relevant in an evaluation-oriented narrative about good and bad places to eat. In Extract 6, the restaurant under discussion is evaluated less favorably. This extract occurred at an earlier point in the same long telephone conversation; the two eating places were not directly compared by the participants and did not occur within the same topical sequence. The details in Extract 6 are less comfortable for cognitive script theory, unless we start to specify a lot of additional scripted features that might be diffrcult to anticipate, Although Bud certainly should get to eat his breakfast (Line 33), the exceptional items here also include things like how many people would be expected to be in the bar (Line 5), carpet cleanliness (Line 13), an adequate number ofwaiters or cooks (Line 28), a reasonable waiting time for receiving the food (Line 35), and the general quality of service (Line 39)' These are produced not merely as nonscripted items that might be noticeable for that reason, like a troop ofjugglers suddenly appearing, or whatever, but as the kinds of script-invoking "expectation failures" that signal those features that restaurant/hotels should normally, according to Extract 6, provide.
We could, of course, proceed to build these details into a cognitive scriptp model and cite this as the basis on which those details are perceptually noticed and linguistically generated, if only we could imagine or discover how many of them there are. Or perhaps we could specify a higher level set of requirements for effrciency and cleanliness in service industries and elsewhere, although this would have to become nonspecific for actual places. The trouble is, any such exercise becomes a post hoc procedure consequent on analysing these sorts of conversations, although for specifying general purpose plan-based cognitive models it would be difficult to know when to stop adding details. We could find ourselves having to speci$' a very large amount ofscript-relevant knowledge that, for any actual conversation or interaction, overspecifies it and fails to show up as relevant. There could be a potentially endless list ofthese kinds offeatures, even excluding as a special case the need to serve breakfast in time for the golfers to go out and play (Extract 6, Line 29). In any case, any such analybical move would sidestep the basic and contentious idea that those details should have the status of mere "noticings," rather than being descriptions constructed from an indefinitely large set ofpossibilities, to perform and to warrant the action of complaining. Indeed, the same kinds of features could plausiblyfigure, with a different kind of discursive gloss, as characteristics of a desirably folksy, laid back, and casual sort of restaurant that contrasts favourably with places that are antiseptic and characterless. It emerges that cognitive script theory, therefore, has endemically serious problems in dealing with the specifics of conversational script and breach formulations.
An alternative approach is to make a virtue of these problems and to consider script-relevant descriptive details as inventively produced and made relevant as part of the production of situated accounts. In the context of producing a complaint, details are descriptively worked up and built into script-relevant formulations, where their status as accurate depictions and as recognizable complaints are interactionally accomplished on the fly rather than existing as prewritten cognitive contents. Note the conoborating appeals to what Claude independently said, in Lines 11-12, and Emma's affiliating interjections. The interactional, evaluating, and complaint-relevant nature of the discourse is further reinforced by what the place is then unfavourably compared to; not another restaurant, as we might expect, but the compensating attractions of its own golf course (Extract 6, Line 42).It is notable that Extract 6 occurs within an extended narratiue sequence in which the places compared are not a set ofdisconnected restaurants but the set ofplaces (a new shopping centre, a restaurant, a golfcourse) that Lottie happened to have visited recently, with Emma's maderelevant reminiscences interspersed. The thread is discursive and interactional, joint narrative and evaluation (see Edwards & Middleton, 1986 ), rather than a conceptualization of what kinds of restaurants there are in the world.
One feature of Nelson's (1981) summary of the restaurant script, whose omission we noticed in the section "Plans and Contingencies: The Restaurant Script," was the need to pay for the meal. The present data set includes a sequence (Extract 7) in which the need to pay for a fishing trip is formulated, and this provides an indication of how and when any such potentially script-basic detail, such as having to pay, might actually be mentioned and made relevant in event reporbing.
Extract 7 NB:fV:1:R:3 In Extract 7, the payment arises as part of an account for not going on a trip. It is a standard feature ofsituated accounts, where invitations are refused, that inability is formulated as the reason, rather than not wanting to go (Drew, 1984; Heritage, 1984) . Although no overt invitation has been issued here, Lottie's account for not being able to go fishing falls into this pattern, where an inability account is provided (Lines Ll-72) in direct contradiction of not wanting, and the expense of hauingto pay isthe specific content ofthat inability account. Emma's response is to cooperate with this account, building it into a scripted version of going on boat trips, in which payment is routirtely due (Lines 16-18, 27-28). As we anticipated in the section "Script Formulations, Interaction, and Accountability," routine or normative versions of ac-tivities are usable as ways of obviating the requirement for specific, personal reasons for actions (see Sacks, lgg2, p. 28 , on the *account apparently appropriate negativer" or A3N). One of the interesting features of script discourse is the way that it forms an integral part of how speakers deal with accountability and with related conceptions of personality and the dispositional causes of behaviour. This kind of relationship, which will be described in more detail in the two following sections, provides a basis for script discourse that leads analysis beyond the explanatory reach ofdisinterested perceptual noticings.
Extract 8 provides two examples of interactionally oriented script talk. The first is a breach formulation that occasions accountability; the second manages that accountability via a script formulation. Jim (Lines 8-9) suggests that Frank sounds like he is falling asleep on the phone, a potentially norm-breaching action that the participants treat as such by requiring an account (Jim, Lines 6, 12) and by starting to provide one (Frank, 21 ). Frank's description of the routine after-beach nap provides a nicely designed piece ofaccountability. The scripted nature ofthe activity (a personal script, but offered and received as a recognizable kind ofthing to do) counters the possibility that he was, on this occasion' finding Jim's conversation boring or soporific. It provides an alternative account for Frank's sleepiness. This deployment of alternatiue uersions illustrates two familiar features of situated talk, which are its rhetorical design (i.e., its orientation to alternative possible descriptions; see Billig, 1987; Edwards & Potter,1992 , and the section "Script Rhetoric" below) and the way in which formulating an event as scripted or routine provides a resource for displaying motive or other psychological states (see Mills, 1940 ), Jim's jocular continuation of Frank's scriptformulated version of the event establishes his affiliation with it and with Frank, in a common, intimate, and jokey world; no harm done.
An important point here is that, in analysing discourse in this way, we do not need to investigate whether or not Frank and his partner actually do take regular afternoon naps, nor whether he really thought so, nor what Jim actually thought about it all. Jim's affiliation with Frank's scripted version is an interactional one, not a guarantee ofhis actual beliefs and feelings. Setting aside the status oftrue beliefs and motives, we can see that the discourse itself is organized in such a way as to display, both for parbicipants and for analysts, how the world can be constructed and intersubjectively oriented to in that way' and how those kinds ofconstructions can be worked up and deployed in situated talk, in the performance of talk's interactional business.
ACCOf]NTABILITY: SCRIPTS INAMORALWORLD
The analysis so far suggests that script and breach formulations can be viewed functionally; that their detail and sequential occurrence make sense in terms of the interactional management of accountability. This raises the wider issue of how people constmct event descriptions as part of making morql sense of the world. One of the robust features of spontaneous event reporting and causal explanation in everyday discourse is that there are two domains of accountabilitythat can mutually implicate each other: accountability for the events in question and accountability for the actions being performed in the reporting of them (Edwards & Potter, 1992 , 1993 ' To explore how script and breach formulations are involved in that reflexive process, an extended sequence of multiple script formulations is examined, split across Extracts 9, 10, and 11. In Extract 9, Lottie is referring to Earl's mother who appears to be terminally ill; Earl is apparently visiting his mother while his father wants him back home. Lottie constructs Earl's situation as problematic (Lines 7,77), a kind of dilemma (Line 6) in which tending the terminally ill has to be weighed against conflicting demands (Line 13) and uncertainty as to what it will involve (Lines 18-20), where Lottie and Emma are themselves concurring with that difficulty of knowing what best to do. Immediately following the construction of Earl's dilemma (Lines 1-6), we have "vouknow it's a (.) kindV a pro:blem" (Line 7), which begins to promote that dilemma as an instance of a more generally recognizable pattern, where a generalized "you" can be pulled in opposite directions (Lines g-11), The "problem" then starts to be handled via further script terms, with elements of the dilemma represented as instances of scripted patterns (Lines 19-23): recognizable ("yqqknow") instances of how a person can sometimes linger on, whereas "you" (Line 23) like to see her alive. Earl's situation is thus cast as a moral dilemma, where script-based formulations are used to construct its recognizable nature and difficulty, and to provide a basis for Lottie's and Emma's affiliations with Earl. The sequence continues in Extract 10. The observation "she dqesn't knqw anybodly" (Line 26) is produced in context as an item relevant to the dilemma of whether Earl (or anybody) should be spending a lot of time with his sick mother (or whoever). Earl's activity is script formulated as minimal and noninteractive ("he goes over there'n he s!ts," Lines 32-42) and then generalized via a comparison with "grandpa," in which, in a further scripted routine, 'Yula'd go sit there'n hold his ha:nd da:::v after da:y dgy4fter Jd*a;y h yqqkn*ow" (Lines 39-4I), and get no sign of recognition.
Further scripted examples, involving "anybody''in general and even Bud (Lines 46-49), corroborate this as a "Salal situation." The rhetorical drift is toward the futility of spending a lot of time with folk for whom, however much you care, it makes no difference that you are there. In Extract 11, this is strengthened by a scripted version ofdegenerative patholory (Lines 64-65), whose generality is again supported by a comparative case (Line 70), where the systemic and irreversible nature ofthe illness, the absence ofsocial response, and the lack ofsuffering combine to build a picture in which, as far as relatives'duties are concerned, there seems little that one can do.e Extract 11 NB:fV: 13:R:5 (...) Exbracts 9 through 11 demonstrate some of the richness and complexity of situated script talk, where multiple script formulations are embedded within interaction sequences such as the one here, involving the resolution of a dilemma. The fact that Lottie and Emma signal agreement should not mask the importance of seeing these script formulations as rhetorical constructions. Not only are they formulated as dilemmatic, followingrecognizable lines of argument and justification (see Billig et al., 1988) , but essentially similar kinds of script formulations, although conflicting ones, occur where participants are openly disagreeing with each other. For example, the sequence in Extracts 9 through 11 bears similarities to one reported by Pomerantz (1984) , in which the difficulty, the uncertainty, and the life chances of a problematical patient are constmcted as part of a potential home nurse's reluctance to take the case. Pomerantz noted how "In trying to convince B to work on the case, Aportrays it in favorable and appealing terms. B, who does not want to take the job, gives it an unappealing and depressing cast" (p. 15a). A detailed analysis of much more open disagreements is provided in a further study of script formulations that focuses on transcripts of counselling sessions involving couples with relationship problems (Edwards, 1994) , but there are clear indications of such disputations in the section that follows.
ITEMS, INSTANCES, GENERALITIES, AND DISPOSITIONS
A major issue for both perceptual-cognitive script theory and discourse theory is how people move from l/ems (singular things that happen or that are described as such) to the status ofthese as instances of a more general pattern to gerrcralized formulatlons of what kind of pattern that is. This is not meant to be a defrnitive typology of kinds of talk, but just as schema theory permits cognitive inferences in either direction (from the general to the particular and vice versa), so discourse theory also recognizes both directions when descriptions are produced (see Billig, 1985 , on particularization and generalization). Script formulations can be fleshed out or warranted by detailed event descriptions,just as events can first be described and then scripted up into generalizations. Again, the issue is what analytical framework we need to make sense of the precise details of situated descriptions. Some extracts are examined in which this interplay between items, instances, and generalities provides discursive resources for building dispositional descriptions of persons, including moral, personal, and pathological traits, formulated for their interactional implications. Extract 12 deals with the character of a (so-constructed) troublesome neighbor. (...) 'n then I wgnE 'n saw Na:ncy? 'n 'hhhh (. Lottae:
Emma:
Lotti-e
The neighbour Pam's character and identity are treated as already established ("youknow"), as "that little (0.3) whqrey thing . . . that talk to the homosexual" (Extract 12, Lines 3-5). The descriptions that follow establish a basis for this description of Pam's character and for the thus warranted notion that Emma and her friends would be justified in trying to get Pam evicted (Line 19). First come some episodic descrip tions, the recent events that are the occasion for this passed-on report from Nancy: a disturbance in the night, a big fight, the police, a "b:furry mess" (Lines 2, 7-73), together with indications of abnormal sexual activity and violence (Lines 14-17).10 But all of this is to be understood as no singular, exceptional occasion; it is part of a regular pattern. Character and consequence (eviction) are built through generalization and script formulation.
The reported events are depicted as part of a pattern, where Emma's routine response to Pam (Lines 20-27), described now as a "Dirtyf:ilthy thingi' (Line 26), is warranted first by a different episode with an ironing board (Lines 28-29) and then by a scripted account of what routinely goes on in Pam's aparbment (Lines 30-33), while next door "pqqr Ngncy'' is engaged in a contrastingly proper routine, trying to get some sleep and go to work. The script details are interesting, in that it is the conuersqtional context that provides for their specific formulation. Playing on the floor and taking showers are difficult to see as general event anomalies for what people get up to in their apartments. In another context, they might sound legitimate and harmless, or nor be mentioned at all, or not in that way. Note how Line S0, ,! d.unno what the hgll they dq" works to create this impression of mysterious misdeeds going on behind closed doors, with,,I dunno,, providing at the same time for the fact that Emma does not have a lot of precise and damning details to offer. Extract 12 demonstrates, therefore, how event items, cross-event comparisons, and scripted event formulations can be descriptively built as part ofthe warranting ofcharacter or personality dispositions, orchestrated for their current interactional upshots and consequences (blamings, justifi cations, future actions).
Much of Emma's and Lottie's talk is of people and events of which they share a lot of experience. These include Emma's husband Bud, the news here for Lottie beingthat Budhas just "walked out" on Emma, leaving her with the uncertainty of who is going to be coming for Thanksgiving dinner. In Extract 13, Emma offers one of several reports to Lottie of what happened. The details in Extract 13 provide an apparent exception to the discursive linking of episode-script-disposition, in that the events described are not directly treated as scripted but are singular events that nevertheless result in Bud being described as ,,ridiculous,, and "crazy." However, script formulations are not far away. There is already some script relevance in that Bud's leaving is produced as being very precipitate, provoked by very little on Emma's part. It is the absence ofanynormativelyrecognizablebasisforBud'sactionsthatprovides ifr" gr;ar for blaming"hi-. Not" also how Buds character is built up ir".i-"pr""aic details, io ,,this" b.eing ndiculous (Line 17), then Bud iri-."ii f"ing ridicuiou. (l,itt" 21) , and then to Lottie's upgrading of ;hJ;"il;'"*lt!t'' (Line 23). Dispositions are presented bv participuntr ur U,rilt from and warranted by generalized action formulations and from 'o* ""."flio"r; it is jusf that the order of presentation of episodes, scripts, a,ti dispositions can be varied or that elements can be treated as understood, wt "t counts is that participants produce It "r" "t"-"nts as linked, as bases for communicating about a coherent world, and for fbrmulating upshots and consequences' In Extract 14' *" Jlrt to see t ow t6" s.tipt"d. Bud's actions are now script formulated and made recognizable as such; Emma says something, Bud takes unreasonable exception to it, Bud packs his clothes and leaves. It is the kind of thing he routinely does ("so many t!:mes"), with other instances starting to be produced to warrant the generalization (Extract 16, . Lottie signals recognition of all this, as Emma invites her to do ('flogknow"), and not only upgrades the description of Bud to "craz5/' but offers a more generalized script formula for "they' '(men, partners, husbands, whatever) Lottie: 2 3 they ljus sgemt to wama hhu,rt us 'n hUrt us ,n httrrt us 'n we' re suppgsed to STAND THERE 'n TAKE Apart from noting the rhetorically organized script-building and disposition-warranting work being done in these extracts, we can note also the relevant sense of specific descriptive details for specifi.ing events. The script formulations "takin"is clo:thes'n leavin"' and,,He PA:CKS UP'n LEAJ:ves" (Extracts 15 and 16) provide just the details required to signal what h,ind of activity it is. Clothes packing is a sufficient particular to identify it as a leaving-to-go-and-stay-somewhereelse, a walking out, and that constitutes the repeated activity.
SCRIPT RHETORIC
The rhetorical basis of script formulations is a pervasive feature of the extracts already examined but one that also deserves special attention. Prior to Extract 18, their daughter Barbara has resisted responding to Emma's repeated requests to her to act as intermediary with Bud; her responses so far have been "yeah?" and "what can I bring, (to Emma's house for Thanksgiving), followed by prompts and requests for further details, such as "[lhat 1la:ppened anything serious?" and "Is thlg been going on lo;ng or wha:t." Part of the problem for Emma is that, having built up the account of her troubles with Bud as serious enough to gain Barbara's s;'rnpathy and intervention, that seriousness starts to provide Barbara with a basis for not bringing her own family to Emma's place for Thanksgiving (Extract 18, Lines 1-9), such that Emma is faced not only with Bud's prospective absence but with Barbara's too. Extract 18 is a small parb oftheir discussion, but it shows how they eventually handle this issue. Emma's response in Line 10, "It's ]Nq N{p:SS AI A:J:LL" provides u gfot. on "rr"rrt, with Bud as nonserious, and this in turn provides a niv conte"t for the description in Line 15 of his recurrent behaviour aJ holiday times. Bud's script-formulatedhabit of walking out prior to irr."r..gi."lng and christmas is now usable by Emma in an opposite *uV, ur"" wa! of normalizing it, rather,than pathologizing him' It is ,oil"t*'g he is kno*n to do now and then, nothing new, nothing Emma and Barbara have not seen before, just Bud.up to his usual ;;k". This now reduces the availabitity of Bud's actions as a reason for Barbara's nonattendance or noninvolvement, and the favour Emma l, *rt"g of her is no longer so arduous. Emma's request for intermear.ry ft"ipi. at last firmlf accepted by B-arbara, with no further delays' s"ript formulations are not o;ly flexibly applicable to events. but are il;;;;uy flexible in the kinds of pathologizing or normalizing uses towhichtheyarecontextuallyput.R''atni.isnotaloose,woollykind of flexibility, but rather u -utf"r of fine-grained interactional design that is realized in the sequential organization and deployment of precise descriPtive details' CONCLUSIONS People do indeed talk on the basis of shared knowledge of what is ,ootini, recognizable, expectable' or else weird or surprising' and the rp".in.'""t,r"te ttd rele,,attce of that knowledge is precisely what is interactionallyaccomplished,oratissue,inthetalking'Discourseis itselfadomainofaction,andthisisamuchunderestimatedmatterin psychological treatments of language and cognition' Analysis of spontaneous discourse s.tgg"st' tha1, rather than underlying action and comprehension in a generative way, scriptedness is, like plans, rules, and other categories of commonsense knowledge, a feature of how participants formulate and orient to actions as recognizable and accountable (see Coultea 1990; Edwards, 1991; Heritage, 1984) . The analysis in the previous section has highlighted a number of features ofhow spontaneous descriptions of activities and events may formulate them as more or less routine and expectable sequences. Actions and events are available to be characterized as items. instances, exceptions, or routines. Such descriptions attend to interactional concerns in the events and in their reporting (see the model of attributional reasoning in Edwards & Potter, 1993) . Specific details are reported not in automatic accordance to their status as perceptual anomalies or expectation failures but with regard to interactive and rhetorical contingencies (such that the status ofbeing an expectation failure is itself discursively produced). The implicative relations between script and anomaly (breach) formulations, and personalitydispositional formulations, are such that activities can be described and responded to on this basis, precisely /or those implications. All of this is a far cry from the disinterested perceivers, making their best sense of the world, that script theory presumes. Although cognitive theorists might wish to distance themselves from participants'interactive and rhetorical business and speculate about a purely sense making cognitive being, to do so is to remove the theory from one of its major domains of applicability, which is natural language use.
Amajor issue for social cognition theory is how much do we need to have scriptsp as ready-made organizations, built in as underlying knowledge structures, to understand how people produce and deal with textual event representations? Seen from the perspective ofdiscourse and conversation analysis, theoretical work derived from artificial intelligence, including script theory, has typically overestimated this requirement, for two reasons: (a) It is paradigmatic cognitive science to do so, to define competence as knowledge representation and to try to model it mentally;li (b) the program, machine or theorized mind has typically been disembodied, placed outside of everyday cultural settings (actual restaurants, supermarkets, fishing trips, and so on; see Norman, 1988; Lave, 1988) and also outside of the often conflicting interactional concerns that people attend to in everyday conversation. This has meant that cognitive representations have tended to be, contrastingly, (a) too comprehensive, doing work that people handle in situated actions and the contingencies of discourse; and (b) too restricted, capable of dealing only with idealized, programatically manageable domains.
Cognitive script theory starts with a set of idealized examples, provided in the form of textual descriptions (e.g., what restaurants are like), rather than with studies of activities and talk, in and of actual settings. Discourse theory suggests the utility of starting with every-day talk and seeing what sort of order that might display. The order it displays is an interactional-rhetorical rather than an event-perception kind of order. This can be compared to Suchman's (1987) argument concerning Tlukese navigators. Suchman contrasted the Thrkese ad hoc kind of navigation with the kind of European map-following model that serves as a metaphor for how cognitive plans are supposed to work. However, a careful theoretical and empirical analysis (ofthe operations of photocopier repair technicians) leads to the claim that situated actions do not proceed fiom plans, even for activities for which plans are available (see Suchman, 1992; Whalen, 1992) . The status of plans is more like the status of script formulations; they provide a basis for accountability, especiallybefore and afterthe action in question, rather than a basis for the activity itself; in any case, they feature as actions in their own right, in the form of situated descriptions, just as script formulations do. The generally post hoc relationship between script formulations and activities is a feature of participants'talk and an object ofanalysis, rather than the analyst's privilege for constructing mental models.
Some of the tensions within script theory may be accounted for by a more basic failure to theorize the location of descriptions within situated practices. For example, the indexical flexibility of situated descriptions is such that, for any given description, there wiII be contextual clues and rhetorically opposed alternatives for interacting participants that reduce the need to build that flexibility into a cognitive world model, Similarly, to the extent that scriptedness is a feature that may be built into the world via descriptions, on the fly and for current interactional purposes, there is less need (indeed, it distorts things) to have those scripts prewritten as features of the speaker's knowledge structures; nor should we assume that script formulations will be, for any speaker and event, singular, definitive, and subject only to cognitive change rather than rhetorical flexibility.
Script theory is clearly dealing with something psychologically real and important. Everyday activities are produced with reference to criteria of orderliness, and are intelligible to participants as more or less routine. Whereas script theory seeks to formalize common sense and to place the scripted, planful nature ofactions prior to accounts, discourse theory treats scripts and plans as discursive productions: ways in which people project, reconstruct, and render intelligible those activities when producing accounts of them. The discourse approach reverses the reality-cognition relation found in script theory, by reversing the mediating nature of language, Discourse is viewed as primary, with cognition and reality its topic or matter at issue. The empirical advantage of a shift from abstracted perceptual models to specific s cipt fo r mul ati o ns is that it ret ains (but reformulates ) the explanatory power of script formulations as ways in which people make sense of the world, while managing to deal with and functionality of how they actually the specific detail, contingency, do so on particular occasions. Raised circles ("degtee" signs) enclose obviously quieter speech. Asterisks signal a "sqeaky" vocal delivery. Numbers in round brackets measure Dauses in tenths of seconds. A micropause, hearable but too short to measure. Additional comments from the transcriber. Colons show degrees ofelongation ofthe prior sound; the more colons, the more elongation. Aspiration (out-breaths); proportionally as for colons. Inspiration (in-breaths) Commas mark weak rising intonation, as used sometimes in enunciating lists. Periods (stops) mark falling, stopping intonation, irrespective of grammar.
APPENDD(
Question marks signal question intonation, irrespective of gTammar. Hyphens mark a cutoffof the preceding sound. A"greater than" sign precedes a faster rate ofspeech; a "less than" sign precedes slower speech. Equals sigrrs mark the immediate "latching" of successive stretches of talk. with no interval. This shows where some within-sequence, or prior within-turn, talk has been omitted from a data extract.
1. Script theory already has a controversial status. Schank's (1982) revision ofthe initial theory dealt with objections to its brittleness and redundancy, by disassembling the classic routines such as restaurant and dentist-visiting scripts into more widely and efficiently usable components, while introducing higher level principles for reassembling them for a greater variety ofsituations. Nevertheless, the essential principles ofperceptually derived schemata, planned actions, and the use of artificial textual representations have remained in place.
2. This stems in turn from a more general approach to language and reality, derived from empirical studies of the texts and laboratory practices of science, and from ethnomethodology and social constructionism; see, for example, Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) , Latour (1987) , Potter and Wetherell (1987), and Woolgar (1988) .
3. Nelson(1981,p.101 )offershersummaryasarestaurantscript"constructedfrom the customer's point of view," thus excluding people who work there, presumably even when eating. Revisions to script theory have decomposed the restaurant script (and others) into more generalized "memory organization packets" (MOPs); these prwide more flexibility and less redundancy but do not alter the basic perceptual-learning features ofscript theory dealt with here (see Note 1).
4. See also Note 2 and the section 'Analytical Principles." "Discourse analysis" refers here to the body ofwork that treats talk and text as forms ofsocial action and the prime site for social constructions of mind and reality; it is distinct from similarly named forms of analysis that deal with text grammar and cohesion and with models of mental processes, and from "sociolinguistics.'
5. Other examples include "she would buy the most impractical things, such as a broom, although they already had one," whereas some were more explicitly oft repeated actions:
"Nearly every morning Kwould cry in the car, being upset about little things" (Smith, 1978, pp. 44-45) . 6. Oneconversation-analysis-derived caveatonthe analytical pursuitofvariability would be that it should feature as a participants'rather than an analysts'category In other words, participants themselves may display some orientation to variability across versions as an accountable matter. Variability is therefore best treated as an analytical heuristic, a way for analysts to look for interaction orientation, rather than an analytical conclusion, namely, that two versions actually are defrnitively different or contradictory. That would be for participants to resolve. Nevertheless, as potential participants in these sorts of conversations, analysts can readily identify cases where such variability issues might be relevant.
?. This information, provided with each data extract, specifies its source in the larger corpus ofJefferson transcripts. The last two numbers refer to the number ofthe transcript (this is the 13th phone call in this series) and to the page number in that transcript (in this case page 25). Some idea ofthe overall sequential relationship between the extracts can therefore be gleaned from this information.
8. Although a Thanksgiving dinner consisting, for example, ofhot dogs, Oreos, and coffee might pose a different przzle for script theory, being unconventional items, the puzzle here is that a perfectly conventional-looking list gels listed. It is not that people do not possess, in some way, conventional knowledge, but a matter ofits role in discourse and everyday activities.
9. Emma remarks a few lines later, after citing another comparative case, "but uh: (0.4) WHAT CAN YOU DO:" 10. Emma estimates shortly afterwards that "about (.) lgn men have keys: to her apartment." See Potter, Wetherell, and Chitty (1991) on "quantification rhetoric."
11. This statement could itselfbe characterized as a script formulation, describing what AI routinely does. But whether its status is that of a mere noticing, or a piece of rhetoric and constructive description, it still works as a critique. "Mere noticings" are, in any case, often the best rhetoric for descriptions.
